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About this Paper 
During 2002 there was a growing inter-
national realisation that the Kaliningrad 
Oblast of the Russian Federation (KO) 
needs more attention than it has received 
in recent years. The aim of this paper is 
to contribute to a more frank and 
innovative debate among politicians, 
experts and the public by elaborating 
options for European actors, Russia 
included, on how to tackle constructively 
the Kaliningrad challenge. 
The paper was prepared by a group of 
independent Kaliningrad experts of dif-
ferent professions from seven European 
countries, including Russia, and the USA. 
At the invitation of the Schleswig-
Holstein Institute for Peace Research at 
the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel 
(SHIP), the group met for two workshops 
in April and October 2002 for intensive 
discussions of their analyses, which led to 
the adoption of this joint statement. This 
statement is based on the in-depth analy-
ses, which are provided in an additional 
book.* 
In jointly presenting their views, the 
members of the group give expression to 
their personal commitment towards con-
tributing to a sound and sustainable 
development of pan-European relations, 
including the Russian oblast. Despite 
different perspectives on some details, 
they reached agreement on many 
concrete ideas on how political actors 
should conceptualise their particular 
Kaliningrad policies and on how they 
might start taking concrete and reason-
able actions, which are in line with both 
the peace project on European integration 
and the Russian proposal for developing 
KO into a pilot-region for EU-Russian 
co-operation. 
The recommendations identify tasks to 
be undertaken by Russia, the EU, many 
other state and non-state actors and inter-
national organizations, not least actors in 
the Russian exclave itself. The recom-
mendations also point out what particular 
actors can do jointly. However, the 
group's members do not regard the paper 
itself as the "last word" on the future of 
Kaliningrad. Rather, the paper is an invi-
tation to all concerned actors to partici-
pate in a continuing dialogue that will, 
however, focus on finding practical, 
problem-solving means of overcoming 
the many obstacles to development and 
enhanced security in the KO. 
 
*) Hanne-M. Birckenbach & Christian Wellmann (eds.), The Kaliningrad Challenge. Options and 
Recommendations (working title), Münster/Hamburg/London (under preparation, Jan. 2003). The 
project was made possible by a generous grant from the German Foundation for Peace Research 
(DSF). Additional financial support came from the Berghof-Foundation for Conflict Research 
(BSK) and the EastWest Institute's Transfrontier Co-operation Programme. 
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Summary of Recommendations 
(The section contains a distillation of the longer and more detailed collection 
of recommendations presented in the overall paper) 
1. The process of problem-solving should be comprehensive, forward-
looking and international. It should meet 
the needs of the Kaliningraders and take 
into account the future of EU-Russia re-
lations, as well as the issues arising from 
the unfolding of a common European 
space. In order to facilitate dialogue on 
disputed issues, actors should take deci-
sions on consensual issues and in parallel 
focus on improving the framework and 
procedures necessary for easing consent 
to be achieved at a later stage also on the 
more divisive and complex issues. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Russia should elaborate on its pro-
posal to develop the KO into a pilot-
region for EU-Russia relations in 
legal, economic, political and societal 
terms. The EU should respond to the 
Russian vision of a pilot-region and, in 
parallel, prepare a supplement to its 
enlargement concept that singles out 
Kaliningrad as a special place, which 
needs coherent and targeted cross-
pillar efforts.  
International organisations have an 
important role. Russia should invite 
the Council of Europe, the OSCE and 
the CBSS jointly to initiate a process 
that allows a multitude of state and 
non-state actors to participate in dia-
logue, to co-ordinate their activities, 
and to give the EU-Russia process 
backing. These organisations should 
open a joint European office on-site 
with participation of skilled Russian 
diplomats. 
2. Realizing an EU-Russia partnership on the Kaliningrad Oblast needs 
developing new institutional ground on 
the part of Russia and its partners. 
On Russia’s part institutional struc-
tures, mechanisms and policy goals 
have to be defined. The Russian 
authorities should officially state that 
the KO is a detached territory of Rus-
sia, where special mechanisms of ad-
ministration and economic regulation 
shall be applied. Russia should also 
strive for concluding indispensable 
international agreements guaranteeing 
a sustainable, non-discriminatory de-
velopment of the KO. The aims of 
Russia’s Kaliningrad policy should be 
to strengthen the political responsibil-
ity of Moscow, while allowing the 
Kaliningrad regional authorities to act 
more flexibly, and to cope with the 
risk of alienation by taking appropriate 
actions in the fields of identity policy, 
transnational co-operation and eco-
nomic policy.  
On the part of EU-Russia relations, 
institutional structures should be es-
tablished that allow practical dialogue. 
This should include: opening of some 
kind of EU Mission in the KO; 
establishing a multilateral Consulta-
tive Commission on the KO, with 
nomination of special representatives 
by all countries concerned; shaping a 
joint governance system, adequate for 
a pilot-region Kaliningrad. 
3. To ensure the KO does not get a bit further isolated when the EU and its 
Schengen system is enlarged, flexibility 
and creativity in the interpretation and 
implementation of the provisions regard-
ing travel across the EU's external border 
are needed.  
The EU should openly reconsider the 
adequacy of its Schengen rules for 
achieving the aims these provisions 
were meant for: minimizing soft 
security risks such as illegal 
immigration, organized crime and 
communicable disease. 
The EU, Lithuania and Poland are re-
commended to consent to prolonging 
temporarily the current border regime 
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without jeopardising for that reason, 
the full integration of the latter two 
states into the Schengen area. Until 
then, Poland and the Baltic states 
should adopt in consent with the EU a 
policy of mutual recognition of their 
national visas. The Schengen member 
states should work towards Kalinin-
graders being able to apply for their 
visas in the KO (and Russia should 
support such efforts) and for liberal-
ising their visa-processing practices. 
Dialogue on a goal of ultimate visa-
free travel between Russia and the EU 
should start soon. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
The European Court should be asked 
for an opinion on the interpretation of 
provisions in the EC Treaty relevant 
for transit. Facilitated transit should 
apply not only to frequent travellers, 
but even more to occasional travellers 
responding to events at short notice. 
Feasibility studies on visa-free transit 
by non-stop trains should include a 
comparative assessment of current and 
likely future airfares, checking 
whether air transport really provides 
an alternative visa-free access to the 
Oblast. The train route via Latvia to/ 
from St Petersburg should be included 
in the transit proposals.  
Russia should improve the efficiency 
of border staff, procedures and deci-
sion-making, reduce costs for Russian 
visas and issue visas at the border. 
4. Solving the problems of shuttle traders would require a study into 
the different types of small-scale cross-
border traders, to understand who they 
are and why they do it and addressing the 
social roots of their way of generating 
income.  
Russia, Poland, Lithuania and the EU 
should develop a policy for small bor-
der traffic, taking into account issues 
such as the need for easy border 
crossing possibilities for locals in 
particular situations. The EU and KO 
neighbours should consider policies 
with limited territorial validity and 
check whether the total KO territory 
should be defined as being a border 
region, eligible for simplified small 
border traffic. 
Development plans for Kaliningrad 
must also consider the areas outside 
Kaliningrad and the larger cities. 
Assist Kaliningrad, Poland and 
Lithuania with the 'conversion' of 
small-scale cross-border traders from 
the 'grey' to the 'legitimate' sector of 
economy. 
5. Russia should point out explicitly that the future economic policy with 
respect to the KO needs to be based on a 
Strategy and a corresponding Programme 
of Action, which are both developed and 
approved jointly by the EU and Russia 
and which should aim at institutional and 
structural reforms that allow the 
Kaliningrad economy to better match EU 
standards of market economy. 
The EU and Russia should immedi-
ately enter into a dialogue on a joint 
economic policy towards KO aiming 
at replacing the Oblast's present 
import-led model of growth by an 
export-led model.  
The EU should indicate which indus-
trial policy measures it recommends 
for the KO, including such elements 
that might deviate from the standard 
procedures applied for modernizing 
the economies of the candidate coun-
tries. 
A joint international task force should 
prepare in-depth studies on the factors 
constraining local businesses from 
expanding their exports, on techno-
logically and economically feasible 
solutions for securing the region's 
energy supplies as well as for 
deregulating regional energy tariffs, 
and on measures of administrative 
reform aiming at the de-bureaucrati-
sation of economic activity in KO. 
Periods of transition should allow 
local enterprises to adapt, for example, 
to the planned revisions of the SEZ 
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regime, new energy tariffs or changing 
certification requirements. To support 
this transition an Information and 
Training Centre for EU Norms and 
Standards should be established.  
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Special attention should be given to 
infrastructure improvement. Measures 
for supporting the increased export-
orientation of local business and 
facilitating communications with 
mainland Russia, as well as with the 
neighbouring countries (a home-based 
air carrier, improving the transit rail-
way line, reconstructing the Elblag–
Kaliningrad highway), should be 
given first priority. The 
telecommunications systems have to 
be brought up to international 
standards and a customised industrial 
estate for Russian and foreign 
investors should be established. 
A Kaliningrad Development Fund (40 
million Euro annually) should be 
established, in the first instance by the 
Northern Dimension group of states. 
6. Participation by the residents of Kaliningrad in the discourse on the 
future of the oblast should increase as 
well as gain in substance.  
Civil society development and capac-
ity building should become part of the 
pilot-region concept. It should extend 
to the rural areas, the media, trade 
unions, institutions of higher educa-
tion, and local self-government. 
Kaliningrad State University and other 
institutions of higher education should 
receive targeted and long-term finan-
cial support from EU sources for 
providing the necessary intellectual 
input. Russian and foreign organiza-
tions should offer assistance and 
training to NGOs in KO; however, a 
Code of Conduct for transnational 
NGO co-operation is needed. A 
donors' forum should seek to identify 
schemes supporting triangular co-
operation between Kaliningrad-based 
NGOs and NGOs in mainland Russia 
and neighbouring countries. 
Encouraging conscious and multiple 
identity-building is also about motivat-
ing people to develop a strong sense of 
“belonging to” the region, and to feel 
responsible for their own societal 
development, to communicate with 
their neighbours, and to help to pursue 
the goal of Russian participation in 
European integration. Research and 
teaching on identity-building in KO, 
acts of commemoration and recon-
ciliation should be officially sup-
ported. Westerners must understand 
and support the objective reality that 
the Kaliningraders are Russian by citi-
zenship and language and predomi-
nantly as well by culture and religion. 
7. The municipalities in the KO should participate in Euroregions. In order 
to meet the expectations appropriate re-
allocations in inter-budgetary relations 
are needed. Further, local officials have 
to be trained in the requirements of trans-
frontier co-operation. Requirements for 
travel across borders have to be shaped in 
a manner that does not hinder trans-
frontier co-operation. The concept of 
Euroregions needs to be reconsidered and 
improved when applied to Kaliningrad. 
Pragmatic steps should follow the 
recommendations given by the CBSS: 
create a Baltic Euroregions network, 
harmonise the EU's procedures and 
rules for receiving grants, ask the 
Nordic Council of Ministers to 
provide counselling to Euroregions on 
legal matters. 
The Council of Europe and other 
respective institutions should address 
the question of which types of border 
region policies are needed for 
successful Euroregion activities under 
the conditions of socio-economic and 
legal asymmetry. Relevant expert 
opinions could be commissioned. 
8. All states in the Baltic Sea Region maintain significant military capaci-
ties, and mutual threat perceptions con-
tinue to exist. Thus, it would not be wise 
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to abstain from further measures of con-
fidence-building, arms control, dis-
armament and, in general, from problem-
solving as regards hard security.  
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Russia should initiate a national dis-
cussion on force level and structure 
optimisation in the KO and adopt a 
federal programme for the conversion 
of the Kaliningrad defence industry 
including military personnel and 
infrastructure.  
Russia and Lithuania should conclude 
a new agreement on military transit (in 
consultations with the EU and 
NATO). 
NATO and Russia should agree on a 
co-operative agenda on the Baltics in 
concrete terms. The OSCE should 
foster negotiations on a revision of the 
CFE Treaty that would include the 
Baltic States, Sweden and Finland, 
and on an extension of Confidence and 
Security Building Measures (CSBM) 
to the sea. Further, it is recommended 
that a dialogue be started on the 
possibilities for limiting military 
activities and for naval arms control in 
the Baltic Sea. Military-to-military 
contacts, joint exercises, and exchange 
of information on military doctrines 
etc. should be encouraged. 
9. Whilst Russian rule in the KO – for reasons of history – is still not fully 
and unambiguously recognized by public 
consciousness outside Russia, the 
Russian authorities continue to express 
worries on the integrity of its exclave and 
the possibility of this being challenged in 
the future, whether from within or with-
out. In addition, some ambiguities also 
exist on the Russian side as regards the 
belonging of the Klaipeda Region to 
Lithuania.  
 
These issues should be neither down-
played nor dramatized; instead they 
should be treated as a self-evident part 
of the overall Kaliningrad discourse 
among the states and – even more 
important – among non-state actors 
and the intellectual community. 
The EU and its member states should 
give official confirmation to Russia, 
without reservations and in a legally 
binding format, that they recognize the 
KO as being also de jure a part of the 
Russian Federation. Such a declaration 
should as well be signed by the 
candidate states. 
The Russian State Duma should 
speedily and positively conclude the 
outstanding ratification of the Russian-
Lithuanian Border Treaty.  
All Baltic Sea countries and societal 
actors, as well as international organi-
sations, are recommended to foster the 
process of reconciliation. 
 
* * * * * 
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General Approach 
The Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian 
Federation (KO) occupied the headlines 
in 2002 when the exclave became the 
subject of dispute between Russia and the 
EU. After the issue had deteriorated into 
mutual recriminations during summer 
2002 the former Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari warned in September that the 
issue was becoming a prestige issue and, 
as such, might harm EU-Russia relations. 
In any case, it is a fact that the KO 
requires more attention from all sides in 
terms of problem-solving than it has 
received in recent years. 
Choosing a comprehensive 
approach 
In 2002 the Kaliningrad agenda has been 
dominated by the issue of the terms that 
will be applied for transit between the 
exclave and mainland Russia, when the 
EU enlarges to include the Baltic States 
and Poland. However, the transit and visa 
issue is not the only problem by far that is 
likely to gain momentum and then to 
cause considerable trouble, also inter-
nationally. Other issues concern the eco-
nomic performance of the region, its lack 
of internal and cross-border infrastruc-
ture, the health situation and social situa-
tion of its inhabitants in general, diverg-
ing views of the region's ambiguous 
history, centre-region relations, the 
region's significance in terms of security 
policies, the strong grey component in the 
region's structure of economic production 
(smuggling and shuttle-trade etc.), envi-
ronmental degradation, the lack of suffi-
cient administrative and intellectual 
capacities and of a functioning civil 
society, migrants and minority issues, 
identity formation, and Russian concerns 
about secessionist tendencies. 
Although these issues are basically 
distinct from each other, the course of 
development of every single issue will 
influence the other issues, positively or 
negatively. In essence, they form a 
complex matrix of, in some cases strong, 
in other cases less strict criss-cross 
dependencies - more a patchwork of 
problems than a set of clear-cut and 
distinct variables. 
In such a complex and interwoven 
setting, the issues cannot be tackled 
effectively on a one-by-one basis. When 
dealing with one issue the effects on 
other issues must be taken fully into 
account in order to avoid problem-solv-
ing with respect to one issue unintention-
ally creating new problems in a different 
area. Conversely, carefully designed 
solutions for one issue may have 
beneficial problem-solving synergies for 
other issues. In any case, the 
interrelations and the wider dynamics 
must be taken into account when 
designing policies and taking decisions in 
whatever area of concern.  
It is against this backdrop that we 
warn against taking the transit/visa issue 
as the one and only real and complicated 
problem to be solved by international 
accord. A much broader approach is 
necessary. 
Of course, comprehensiveness in-
volves a lengthy dialogue, whereas 
people in Kaliningrad or in neighbouring 
countries might fear that time is running 
out and that they cannot wait. Indeed, the 
EU-Russia negotiating and clarification 
process is under pressure of time because 
it started late and crucial measures may 
be taken unilaterally. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to escape from the pressure of 
time and from fears of losing prestige if 
the appropriate political and diplomatic 
means are applied. 
The political actors should widen the 
perspective and agree to adopt a com-
prehensive approach that meets the 
following criteria:  
» Problem-solving activities should meet 
the needs of the people concerned and 
at the same time respond to the 
broader question pertaining to the 
future of the EU-Russia relations, the 
principles upon which these relations 
 
 
8 Kaliningrad Policy Paper  
 
are to be constructed, and the unfold-
ing of an European space at large. 
Particular problems like the tran-
sit/visa issue should be seen as a 
chance to jointly and thoroughly de-
velop a broader perspective, which 
supports the solving of problems as 
well in other issue areas.  
» 
» Priority should be given to reaching 
decisions on issues where consensus 
can readily be attained. Decisions that 
obviously need further considerations 
should be postponed and, at the same 
time, the necessary facilities and in-
centives for dialogue on the disputed 
aspects should be organized, and the 
implications of the envisioned deci-
sions, their implications and the alter-
natives should be evaluated in a 
broader context.  
Linking the future to the present 
The most challenging demand when de-
signing a concept for problem-solving is 
the necessity to escape from the limita-
tions of status-quo-thinking. Instead, an 
assessment of how a rapidly changing 
world might look in the foreseeable 
future should provide the criteria for 
identifying which solution would best fit 
a problem existing today (future-oriented 
politics). 
The prognosis for Kaliningrad reads as 
follows. For Russia, efforts that aim at 
solving the problems of and with the ex-
clave on its own, would be costly and un-
realistic because Russian domestic poli-
tics do not permit concentrating enough 
resources on Kaliningrad, and because 
the country has no direct grip on relevant 
aspects influencing Kaliningrad's devel-
opment. The EU, by contrast, might 
mobilize enough funds and might have 
the possibilities to set the rules concern-
ing borders and transit. However, the EU 
does not have jurisdiction in Kaliningrad, 
nor is it striving for it. Thus, the EU also 
will be neither able nor willing to solve 
its problems with the exclave solely by its 
own means.  
It is obvious that interdependence 
between Russia and the EU exists as con-
cerns problem-solving. Either both join 
their efforts or they will both be affected 
negatively by (partly differing) unsolved 
issues. Consequently the best future of 
Kaliningrad will be one of shared respon-
sibilities.  
Problem-solving as regards Kalinin-
grad needs – so to speak – "a new ideol-
ogy" that conforms with this prognosis. 
Both sides, the EU and Russia, have a 
point of departure for such a new ideol-
ogy, but are far from agreeing upon it. On 
the part of the EU this is the European 
peace project of integration. On the part 
of Russia this is the idea of developing 
Kaliningrad into a pilot-region for EU-
Russia co-operation, which was first 
voiced in autumn 1999 in the context of 
Russia's medium-term EU strategy. How-
ever, whilst the EU failed to combine its 
enlargement project with the European 
peace project of integration, the Russian 
side failed to substantiate the pilot-region 
proposal. Instead both ideas became part 
of a game in which the parties recipro-
cally pass the buck to the other side.  
But there should be an alternative if 
the Russian vision of a pilot-region 
Kaliningrad is transformed into a shared 
concept that can work - because it is con-
crete in legal, economic, political and 
societal terms, because it refers to the 
relevant facts of the present situation and 
because it incorporates a future of shared 
responsibility.  
The emergence of such a concept lies 
very much on Russian shoulders. But it is 
also a challenge to the EU, which needs 
to provide substance to the slogan about 
"Europe whole and free" instead of slid-
ing into a "Fortress Europe" that would 
be conducive to the creation of isolated 
and unstable outsiders. The EU policies 
of peace should be pursued through the 
creation of welfare and stability rather 
than just conceiving Kaliningrad nar-
rowly as a source of harm and social ills, 
to be kept at distance by strict policies of 
bordering. 
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» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Regardless of whether the EU sup-
ports or ignores the idea of a pilot-
region, Russia should commission 
experts in order to elaborate the idea 
in concrete terms to make it a prom-
ising concept in the country’s policy 
towards Europe.  
After Russia recently reaffirmed the 
idea and envisioned a common Euro-
pean economic, legal and humanitar-
ian space, it is the EU's turn to take 
the initiative and respond in a pio-
neering spirit to the Russian vision of 
a pilot-region Kaliningrad, to encour-
age the Russian side to develop a 
more detailed posture which is 
supported by figures, facts and legal 
provisions, to offer the country 
substantial support for transforming 
the present situation into one that 
would allow establishing the pilot-
region in concrete terms, and to 
encourage Russia to engage in 
dialogue on the creation of a common 
agenda in the light of shared respon-
sibility.  
In parallel the EU should prepare a 
supplement to its enlargement concept 
that refers to the European peace 
project of integration and singles out 
Kaliningrad as a special place, which 
needs coherent and targeted cross-
pillar efforts.  
Other actors involved in Kaliningrad 
affairs and consultants on behalf of 
whichever side should seek harmony 
of their suggestions with both the 
European peace project on integration 
and the vision of a pilot-region 
Kaliningrad.  
Looking behind the rhetoric with 
empathy 
The actors addressing the Kaliningrad 
puzzle are undoubtedly of good will, but 
they are subject to specific restrictions 
that hinder the ability of their good will 
to result in success.  
Quite naturally, every actor involved 
in Kaliningrad-related affairs is guided by 
its own perceptions, aims and interests. 
No actor is to be blamed for that. The 
result, however, is that the guiding prin-
ciples are not in harmony with each 
other. Instead we find, for example, a 
clash of views held by the Russian 
Federation and the actors in KO (for 
some the oblast is only one of 89 subjects 
all to be treat the same, for others it is a 
unique case needing specific attention), 
in Kaliningrad itself a clash of aspirations 
and capabilities (comparing with the 
West while lacking comparable 
resources) and between the EU, Russia 
and its exclave, competing interests (soft 
security versus development).  
To avoid deadlocks and disputes to 
gain dominance over progress in prob-
lem-solving, actors that aim at getting the 
first steps done should practice empathy. 
That is to say, one need not be sympa-
thetic towards the other, but should 
understand the other’s moves and 
motives from the perspective of his, not 
one's own standpoint and worldview. 
Otherwise the aforementioned differing 
perceptions of the situation, the far apart 
starting points, as well as the varying 
interests and priorities, will not be 
bridged.  
The historical Russian ambivalences 
concerning the country’s cultural and 
political belonging to Europe, the hard-
ships of some ten years of severe trans-
formation crisis, and the socio-
psychological trauma of the country’s 
loss of greatness have to be acknowl-
edged as a part of the basis on which co-
operation and a mediation of interests are 
nevertheless possible. Russia, as well as 
its neighbouring countries, is deeply 
influenced by the experiences of previous 
generations. 
Disputing parties should practice 
empathy, i.e. communicate why the 
disputed issues are as sensitive as they 
are, and give clear signals that they 
understand how the problem, its 
extension and relevance, is perceived 
by each side.  
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» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Non-Russian actors should explicitly 
indicate that they are aware of the 
particularity of present-day political 
life in Russia. Equally, Russian actors 
will be more likely to get their inter-
ests recognised as important when 
they explicitly indicate that they are 
aware of the traumas experienced by 
the neighbouring countries.  
On all sides the use of provocative and 
misleading language (including the 
use of place names that do not comply 
with the historical period under con-
sideration) should be avoided.  
Involve international channels  
It is generally agreed that Russia and the 
EU should take the lead in uniting their 
efforts to give Kaliningrad a fair chance 
to develop by way of effective integration 
into the Baltic/European space. There is, 
however, considerable evidence that the 
EU-Russia process would be likely to be 
overburdened by such a role.  
One reason is the complexity of the 
Kaliningrad challenge; another is that 
attempts to reach solutions must be pre-
pared for failures, breakdowns and dis-
appointments, as progress will not meet 
all expectations and success will be only 
relative. The fact that a multitude of 
actors are already involved in Kalinin-
grad affairs, which all follow different 
interests and frequently talk at cross-pur-
poses, makes it necessary to deal with 
Kaliningrad not only bilaterally but also 
multilaterally.  
Strengthening of dialogue and in-
creasing co-ordination among the multi-
tude of actors are critical in order to 
achieve synergies, transparency, and con-
fidence between them. It is also necessary 
to monitor the concrete dynamics with 
impartiality, to channel emotions and 
transform disputes into more rational 
attitudes and considerations. At a stage 
where accusations emerge that human 
rights and sovereignty rights are being 
violated, efforts at mediation are overdue 
in order to escape from an escalating 
logic of polarisation.  
This clearly refers to international 
organisations. Their capacity is to keep 
tensions within limits and ensure that 
human rights and sovereignty claims will 
not be played off against each other nor 
become forces for escalation. They can 
pave the way for problem-solving activi-
ties and sustainable results even in phases 
when EU-Russia negotiations might not 
be at a good stage or stalled.  
Russia should take the initiative and 
invite the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE to play a role in Kaliningrad 
affairs and join their efforts with those 
of the CBSS. 
These international organisations 
should initiate a process that allows a 
multitude of state and non-state actors 
to participate in dialogue, co-ordinate 
their activities and give the EU-Russia 
process backing. Their mandate 
should have a particular focus on 
clarification of standards and com-
mitments, implementation of agreed 
European principles, and provision of 
an international long-term presence 
on site: The organisations should open 
a joint office. It should work as a pan-
European House and serve as a 
clearinghouse. The staff should in-
clude skilled Russian diplomats be-
cause Russian support is decisive for 
making it a success story: It would 
demonstrate that international efforts 
concur with Russian interests.  
Other states, experienced statesmen or 
mediators, should encourage Russia to 
overcome its reservations against 
international involvement in Russian 
affairs, motivate other actors to par-
ticipate in the efforts of international 
actors to promote dialogue and co-
ordination, and try to build a coalition 
of the willing and to extend it.  
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Institutional Framework 
Establishing an EU-Russia partnership on 
the Kaliningrad Oblast needs laying new 
institutional ground. On the part of 
Russia a coherent federal legislation and 
administrative innovations are required. 
On the part of both the EU and Russia 
institutional structures and mechanisms 
have to be defined. 
Developing coherent legislation 
and administrative innovation 
It is an undisputed matter of fact that the 
Russian authorities are the key actors in 
assuring the KO’s future as a part of 
Russia. In view of its unique situation as 
a detached territory it is as essential as it 
is sensitive to better define the status of 
the Oblast within the federal system of 
Russia, as well as the relations between 
the centre and the region.  
The existing unclear regulations of 
these relations are inadequate for coping 
successfully with the unprecedented 
strong - and still growing - impact on the 
Oblast of external developments, which 
are not under the influence or even con-
trol of Russian authorities (not least EU 
enlargement). A clearly expressed long-
term concept for KO development, laid 
down in an integrated document, is 
needed as a basis and point of reference. 
The need for adopting a Constitutional 
Law on Kaliningrad was expressed by 
Russian experts. However, as this is un-
likely to be achieved in the near future, 
the recommendations focus on less com-
plicated steps, which might function as a 
substitute but reflect the need for Russian 
policy to distinguish the Kaliningrad case 
from its general regional policy. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Russian authorities should officially 
state within the framework of their 
regional policy that the KO is a de-
tached territory of Russia, where 
special mechanisms of state admini-
stration and economic regulation shall 
be applied which aim at guaranteeing 
reliable transport, cultural, social and 
other communications with mainland 
Russia, while simultaneously fostering 
integration of the KO into a system of 
economic, trade and other trans-
national relations being under forma-
tion in the Baltic Sea region. 
In practical terms the possibility 
should be considered by the Russian 
authorities to allow, under conditions 
and procedures to be specified, such 
federal legislation, which might or 
would worsen the economic situation 
of the KO, to be implemented there 
only with some delay. 
Russia should work towards conclud-
ing essential international agreements 
(first of all with the EU), guaranteeing 
a sustainable, non-discriminatory de-
velopment of the KO under the fore-
seeable conditions of its future 
existence. 
Instead of getting trapped in a false 
dichotomy of centralisation versus de-
centralisation Russia should invent an 
approach, which combines both: "opera-
tional decentralization" based on "strate-
gic centralization". The main goals of this 
policy would be (a) to strengthen political 
responsibility of Moscow, (b) to allow 
Kaliningrad regional authorities to act 
more flexibly, and (c) to cope with the 
risk of alienation. 
Recommended means for strengthening 
the role of the Federal Centre in the 
solution of political and foreign policy 
problems are: 
to provide a "fast track" mechanism 
for introducing necessary changes in 
the federal legislation concerning 
Kaliningrad and in general to provide 
a sound legislative basis for a signifi-
cantly less rigid and more rule-based 
administration for the KO; 
to create within the Presidential Ad-
ministration or on the level of the Fed-
eral Government a special adminis-
trative unit ("Steering Commission on 
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Basic Subsistence and Development of 
the KO"); it should function as the co-
ordinating body for all state activities 
concerning the KO, including adop-
tion of a development strategy for the 
KO in the context of its envisaged role 
as a pilot-region of Russia-EU part-
nership; 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
to nominate the KO as central for 
implementing the Russian European 
and Baltic Sea region policy; 
to create and to define the status of a 
Permanent Federal Representation in 
Kaliningrad for issues related to co-
operation with the EU and in the 
Baltic Sea region. 
Recommended measures for increasing 
flexibility and responsibility of the 
regional authorities in dealing with 
social and economic development of the 
Oblast are:  
to grant more authority to the regional 
government in matters of regional 
economic and trade policies; 
to include the Oblast in the list of 
regions where the initiative on im-
proving the civil service will be im-
plemented and to reform the oblast's 
administration in line with best inter-
national and Russian practice. 
Recommended measures for diminishing 
the risk of alienation from mainland 
Russia are:  
in the field of identity policy, to 
strengthen a common informational 
space, to support cultural exchange 
and people-to-people contacts with 
mainland Russia, as well as to develop 
the mobility of the population. 
in the field of transnational co-opera-
tion, to strengthen the involvement in 
Baltic Sea region-based co-operation 
(as compared to EU-oriented 
schemes) by developing more co-
ordinated and joint actions by the KO 
and the other Russian north-western 
regions, and by allowing KO munici-
palities, in terms of financial means 
and training, to play a greater role in 
cross-border activities with neigh-
bouring countries. 
in the field of economic policies, to 
provide incentives (e.g. via the 
Federal Target Programme 2002 - 
2010) for Russian corporations to 
establish enterprises in the KO.  
Creating structures and 
mechanisms of an EU-Russia 
partnership on Kaliningrad 
In the last decade the authorities of the 
Russian Federation and of the KO gave 
some proof of their preparedness to 
compromise over the extent and spheres 
of influence on the region. However, for 
different reasons, solutions that had fos-
tered the making of the pilot-region proj-
ect or other concepts of joint Russia-EU 
action, did not come into being, although 
some measures are in the pipeline. 
The best will to co-operate cannot 
materialize as long as the actors do not 
have established institutional structures 
that allow them "to talk business". At the 
initial stage of adjusting the relations 
between Russia and the EU concerning 
the Kaliningrad factor, each side must 
consider what are their own practical 
steps in order to build a common struc-
ture. Ultimately, joint steps have to be 
taken. 
The EU should create policy tools for 
dealing with Kaliningrad and allowing 
timely and dynamic responses to new 
situations. Opening some kind of EU 
Mission in Kaliningrad should be con-
sidered. 
The establishment of a multilateral 
Consultative Commission on Kalinin-
grad is recommended in order to pro-
vide a viable framework for a continu-
ous dialogue between Brussels and 
Moscow, and which would include all 
interested Baltic Sea region countries. 
In parallel, discussions on an agree-
ment or a special protocol should 
continue, which amends the Partner-
ship and Co-operation Agreement with 
respect to the KO and gives the new 
structures and mechanisms a binding 
quality in order to indicate the seri-
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ousness of the parties' commitment, its 
long-term nature and its strategic 
significance for the development of 
Russia-EU relations in general. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Special representatives on Kalinin-
grad affairs should be nominated by 
all countries participating in the proc-
ess and be equipped with a clear 
mandate. Their main purpose should 
be to adjust respective positions and 
propose necessary changes in national 
and EU legislations. 
The Parliaments should fulfil a two-
fold task: providing the executives 
with the legislative basis appropriate 
for the new type of EU-Russia co-
operation, but also making sure that 
legislative acts by different Parlia-
ments become more coherent. 
Being a first practical step in this 
direction, the Kaliningrad case may be 
regarded as an opportunity for 
Moscow and Brussels to draw upon 
useful experience for formulating 
negotiating chapters appropriate to 
building a Common European Space, 
including the KO but going beyond as 
well. 
If the pilot-region strategy is taken seri-
ously, the obvious challenge is to open a 
path for establishing an appropriate gov-
ernance system serving the interests of 
the people in Kaliningrad, of the Russian 
Federation and the EU, as well as their 
common interest in the EU-Russian rela-
tionship. For this reason, the integrity of 
the Oblast within the Russian Federation 
is an imperative. The implementation of 
such a system of governance would need 
reconsideration of the administrative 
system of the exclave by the federal cen-
tre. After the presidential authority in the 
region has been strengthened, the time 
will come to involve the EU, not only as 
a donor or partner in negotiations, but 
also into decision-making on the oblast as 
far as it concerns issues that can be suc-
cessfully tackled only on the basis of 
common responsibility. 
The Russian authorities should seriously 
consider devising a governance system 
which includes the new elements men-
tioned above; however, at the same time 
it should go further as it meets not only 
the specifics of the KO, but also its future 
as a Russia-EU pilot-region. In a pre-
paratory step national and international 
experts should be asked to deliver expert 
opinions on various concepts and their 
risks, preconditions and probable out-
come. These opinions should consider in 
particular the following conceptual 
elements:  
the required joint EU-Russia decision 
on the pilot-region project: It might be 
set within the framework of the 
abovementioned EU-Russia agreement 
or special protocol on Kaliningrad. It 
might envisage the consolidation of 
Russian and European resources for 
project elaboration and implementa-
tion. It might also define the mandate 
and the structure of a joint project 
management system that would govern 
a Russian-European Partnership Pro-
gramme in KO; 
the revisions needed on the Federal 
Target Programme 2002-2010 to 
make it a departure for the Partner-
ship Programme and the pilot-region 
approach, including its development 
strategy; 
an internationally composed Pilot 
Region Project Administration 
(PRPA) functioning as the core 
management system: Its concrete 
responsibilities, derived from its 
mandate, might be distinctly 
differentiated and clearly delimited by 
respective agreements between the 
regional administration and the 
PRPA. Managerial decision-making 
might be based on the results of 
monitoring and forecasting of the 
social and economic situation in the 
region. This work might be assigned to 
independent bodies such as the 
Kaliningrad Regional Development 
Agency; 
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» 
» 
» 
a permanent joint Russian-European 
Commission on implementation of the 
Partnership Programme in the KO to 
provide co-ordination at the highest 
international level.  
Border Regime 
Perceiving the future of Kaliningrad and 
Russia-EU relations in the light of shared 
responsibility does not imply that borders 
become less relevant. Obviously the 
opposite is the case, as border regimes 
appear to be the most disputed issue at 
present.  
When trying to understand why they 
represent such a sensitive subject one 
finds that very different dimensions are 
interlinked. History and prestige matters 
as do competing interests.  
For economic, political, cultural and 
human reasons the necessity exists to 
extend border crossing. In parallel, the 
aspiration exists that in order to protect 
the people, the political system, welfare, 
culture, identity or whatever against risks 
of "soft security", states should have 
control over those who cross the borders. 
They also generate income – not only for 
consulates taking fees for providing 
visas, but also for a remarkable number 
of people who make their living by 
crossing the border. In contrast with the 
former, the latter contribute to a negative 
image of Kaliningrad as well as to its 
relative and still insufficient welfare. 
Thus, although the current practice at the 
border with Kaliningrad neighbours is in-
convenient, any change in the border 
system will cause unrest for emotional 
and practical reasons.  
Allowing flexibility regarding 
travel across borders 
With regard to the current (October 2002) 
dispute between Russia and the EU on 
the terms of transit between Russia and 
its Kaliningrad exclave, the EU, Poland, 
Lithuania and Russia presumably will 
reach, sooner or later, some sort of 
agreement, as there is a strong will for 
co-operation on all sides. But will the 
settlement really contribute in substance 
to problem-solving as regards Kalinin-
grad or will it only postpone the insight 
as to what the actual dynamic of the 
Kaliningrad challenge is about? Will the 
solution be substantial or only a matter of 
saving face after the parties have already 
tied themselves down publicly? 
Attempts at problem-solving should 
not shy away from recognising the fact 
that concepts sometimes fail to meet the 
reality. In spite of the fact that it takes 
great effort to get them adopted, the EU, 
its member states and the applicants, are 
well advised to allow themselves a more 
creative and constructive interpretation of 
the Schengen agreement, as they demon-
strated throughout the preceding months. 
Adopting a more flexible implementation 
of its provisions should permit meeting 
the demands of Russia and the needs of 
the Kaliningraders without putting the 
fulfilment of the agreement's aims under 
any significant additional strain.  
The EU should intensively and 
honestly focus on the fundamental ques-
tion of whether or not the introduction of 
Schengen visas for Kaliningraders and 
transit participants will accomplish the 
EU's objective of keeping out soft secu-
rity risks originating from Russia to a 
degree significantly higher than at pre-
sent. Anyhow, one can argue with good 
reasons that the Schengen policy has not 
successfully created an EU external 
border that protects against soft security 
risks such as illegal immigration and 
organized crime. 
The EU should frankly reconsider the 
adequacy of its Schengen provisions in 
terms of achieving the aims they were 
intended for. 
To allow a process of self-reflection 
and to identify more coherent and 
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flexible solutions for the Kaliningrad 
visa and transit issue, the EU, Lithua-
nia and Poland are recommended to 
consent to prolonging temporarily the 
current status quo beyond the dates 
being unilaterally announced for 
introducing visas, but without post-
poning the envisioned date for full 
integration of the two states into the 
Schengen area.  
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Request the European Court for an 
opinion on the interpretation of Art. 3 
(d) of the EC Treaty that, if the cross-
ing of the EU external borders is not 
for entry into and circulation within 
Community territory, a visa may not 
be required (e.g. airport transit). Is 
this provision applicable to the transit 
between KO and mainland Russia? 
Recognize that the proposal of the EU 
Commission from 18. Sept. 2002 
regarding a Facilitated Transit 
Document only applies to frequent 
travellers, but travellers who do not 
match the criteria of frequency may 
have the best humanitarian case 
because they need to travel between 
Kaliningrad and various parts of 
Russia to visit family. Develop a pro-
posal that takes their needs into 
account. 
The Russian proposal for visa free 
transit by non-stop trains should be 
taken seriously. The feasibility study 
which the EU Commission announced 
it would have undertaken should 
include a comparison of air fares and 
an assessment of likely fare structures 
in the future. Latvia should be added 
to the discourse on transit because the 
most efficient train route between 
Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg is via 
Latvia. 
The EU and its member states should 
consider possibilities which allow 
Kaliningraders to apply for visas for 
all Schengen member states on-site in 
KO (for instance one country would 
carry out consular processing of 
applications for other Schengen mem-
ber states) and Russia should agree to 
creating such a mechanism. The 
Schengen states should review their 
practise of issuing visas in the context 
of applying a more liberal approach 
(for instance granting a visa for the 
whole period of invitation, personal 
interviews at the consulate only as an 
exception, easier access to visas for 
Russian officials that must do business 
in Brussels). 
Encourage Poland and the Baltic 
States to adopt, in agreement with the 
EU, a policy of mutual recognition of 
their national visas for the interim 
period until they are granted full 
Schengen member status. 
Russia should improve the efficiency 
of border staff and procedures (e.g. 
copying visas by hand) and should 
consider measures of reorganization 
aiming at quick decision-making with-
out referral back to Moscow-based 
authorities. The prices of Russian 
visas should be reduced and possibili-
ties for obtaining visas at the border 
should be considered. 
The dialogue on a goal of ultimate 
visa-free travel between Russia and 
the EU, which Russia proposed and to 
which the EU Commission agreed to 
enter, should start soon and be 
handled constructively, with a clear 
commitment towards achieving this 
goal. 
Solving border problems by 
addressing their social roots 
The tens of thousands of shuttle-traders 
(from both sides of Kaliningrad's 
borders) and their socio-economic 
situation constitute a special case in the 
context of establishing a new border 
regime. How can a social disaster and a 
fuelling of smuggling activities be 
avoided?  
Up to now, small-scale cross-border 
traders have been more the subject of 
anecdotes and speculation than of serious 
knowledge. The group is far from 
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homogenous and consists of primitive 
low-income entrepreneurs, individual 
small-scale smugglers as well as 
members of larger circles of systematic 
smuggling, which might even have con-
nections to serious organized crime. 
These different categories of traders 
should be distinguished from each other 
and treated differently, although this is 
not an easy task as the delimitations are 
blurred. 
Two opposing ways of handling the 
issue are apparent: Enabling small-scale 
cross-border trade to continue, while 
limiting its impact on other cross-border 
movements, would satisfy the bulk of 
shuttle-traders and the occasional legiti-
mate travellers; implementation of a 
much more strict border control regime 
would satisfy the state authorities.  
In order to address the problem appro-
priately one should move beyond the 
border-posts to find a solution. Any 
changes in the border regime should be 
guided by measures ensuring that those, 
who nowadays earn their living in the 
semi-legal trans-border economy between 
Kaliningrad and Poland, and Kaliningrad 
and Lithuania, are not forced into real 
criminality. 
» 
» 
» 
Encourage investigation into the 
different types of small-scale cross-
border traders and understand who 
they are and why they do it. 
Russia, Poland, Lithuania and the EU 
should develop a policy for small 
border traffic. This should take into 
account the increasing differences in 
prices and living standards between 
the opposite sides of the border, as 
well as issues such as the need for 
easy border crossing possibilities for 
locals engaged in Euroregion co-
operation, the situation in the 
"divided" town Kybartai/Chernishev-
skoye, and the fate of Lithuanian 
workers commuting at Vishtynetskoye 
Lake. The EU and KO neighbours 
should consider policies with limited 
territorial validity and assess whether 
the total KO territory should be 
classified as being a border region, 
eligible for simplified small border 
traffic. 
Provide alternative means of employ-
ment. Development plans for Kalinin-
grad must also consider the areas out-
side Kaliningrad city and the coastal 
towns of the oblast. Assist Kalinin-
grad, Poland and Lithuania with the 
'conversion' of small-scale cross-
border traders from the 'grey' to the 
'legitimate' sector of economy. 
Economic Development 
The core challenge for any problem-
solving as regards Kaliningrad is to 
reverse its economic decline and to bring 
about a level of growth and wealth which 
reduces, instead of widening, the welfare 
gap between the region and its (current 
and future EU) neighbours.  
To tackle this challenge successfully 
would meet not only the needs of the 
Kaliningraders. It would also have a 
positive economic spill-over for Russia as 
well as the neighbours. Further, it is a 
fundamental prerequisite for avoiding a 
social basis for separatism to emerge and 
for removing the roots of all those soft 
security risks the EU is afraid of. Thus, 
successful economic development of the 
region is also of high interest to the 
Russian Federation as well as the EU and 
its member states. Consequently, eco-
nomic policies have to be at the centre of 
concern of the pilot-region project. 
To bring about a prospering Kalinin-
grad economy is clearly beyond whatever 
market forces can regularly do, and calls 
for deliberate government policies, as 
well as considerable financial resources. 
There are some analogies with the West-
Berlin case: although in many respects 
not comparable with Kaliningrad under 
conditions of EU encirclement, it never-
theless indicates that an enclave economy 
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needs compensatory measures to offset 
its geopolitical disadvantages, including 
customised preferential policies and 
support schemes that strengthen its 
attractiveness and competitiveness.  
It is not a question about whether 
Kaliningrad needs funds, preferences and 
subsidies. It is a question about what 
economic policy will provide the frame-
work for successful development and by 
which institutional and legal reforms it 
has to be accompanied. 
The present scheme of economic 
activity is centred on the Special Eco-
nomic Zone regime. The tax concessions 
on imports have clearly brought some 
immediate relief for the Kaliningraders, 
compared with if nothing had happened, 
and they have generated vested interests 
for prolonging it.  
However, the present economic policy 
concept for the Oblast provides no sound 
base for long-term sustainable and stable 
growth and may well be at risk as a con-
dition of Russia’s accession to the WTO. 
The SEZ regime provides strong incen-
tives for engaging in trade and servicing 
of imports, and encourages tax evasion 
and grey economy activities, but does not 
provide an adequate incentive for 
modernizing Kaliningrad's industrial base 
nor for achieving import-substitution and 
export-orientation of the regional econ-
omy.  
The Kaliningrad economy is a "bubble 
economy" pumped up by considerable 
federal funds and one that wastes large 
volumes of foreign currency. EU en-
largement may stimulate some additional 
growth, but mostly by further expanding 
the bubble and consuming more foreign 
currency. The Federal Target Programme 
2002-2010 does not alter this prospect 
and maintains the out-dated idea of 
keeping Kaliningrad autarkic as regards 
energy supplies. 
The radical alternative, to integrate 
Kaliningrad fully, and in a short time-
frame, into the European economic space 
is purely hypothetical and would, any-
way, result in disastrous damage to 
Kaliningrad's economy, combined with a 
socio-economic shock close to catastro-
phe. Instead, the pilot region concept 
provides a feasible alternative, moving 
carefully and selectively between the 
opposing extremes of either continuing 
the present course or of overburdening 
Kaliningrad by exposing it fully to the 
rigours of the European economic space. 
In line with its own vision of Kalinin-
grad as a pilot-region of EU-Russia 
relationship, Russia should point out 
explicitly that the future economic 
policy with respect to the KO needs to 
be based on a Common Strategy and a 
corresponding Programme of Action, 
which are both developed and 
approved jointly by the EU and 
Russia. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
The EU should reconsider its percep-
tion about prospects and risks of the 
KO economic development after EU 
enlargement and indicate which 
industrial policy measures it recom-
mends for the KO. This consideration 
should include the possibility of meas-
ures that might differ from the stan-
dard procedures applied for modern-
izing the economies of the candidate 
countries. 
The EU and Russia should immedi-
ately enter into a substantive dialogue 
on a joint economic policy towards 
KO. Its purpose should be to define a 
policy line aiming at replacing the 
Oblast's present import-led model of 
growth by an export-led model, which 
takes advantage of niches in the pan-
European division of labour appropri-
ate for Kaliningrad's economy. 
The Common Strategy and the Pro-
gramme of Action should aim at insti-
tutional and structural reforms that 
allow the Kaliningrad economy to 
match the EU’s standards for a market 
economy. It is recommended that 
Russia revises the existing Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) regime in 
favour of exports, and modifies the 
Federal Target Programme for the 
Kaliningrad development until 2010 in 
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a way that supports a re-orientation 
on export industry development. Re-
ciprocally, the EU should grant 
special incentives that support access 
for Kaliningrad exports to EU mar-
kets. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
In a first-priority step a joint inter-
national task force should prepare in-
depth studies on the factors con-
straining local business from ex-
panding exports, on technologically 
and economically feasible solutions 
for securing the region's energy sup-
plies as well as for deregulating of the 
regional energy tariffs, and on meas-
ures of administrative reform aimed at 
a de-bureaucratisation of economic 
activity in KO. 
A policy for re-structuring and mod-
ernizing the region's economy must 
include periods of transition, allowing 
local enterprises to adapt, among 
other things, to the scheduled revi-
sions of the SEZ regime, changes in 
energy tariffs or new certification 
requirements. In supporting the tran-
sition process an Information and 
Training Centre for EU Norms and 
Standards should be established. 
Any attempts to modernize the region's 
economy and to develop export-oriented 
business must be underpinned by pro-
viding investors with well functioning 
transport and communications infra-
structure.  
Due to a partly obsolete and partly 
missing infrastructure, its upgrading must 
rank top in any sound economic policy. 
To prevent Kaliningrad from becoming 
isolated when the EU has enlarged and 
the Lithuanian-Polish border has become 
Schengen-internal, it is especially critical 
to upgrade cross-border transport by air 
and land, a course of action that needs 
appropriately co-ordinated measures in-
side and outside the Oblast. 
It is recommended that Russia and the 
EU pay special attention to infra-
structure improvement. Measures sup-
porting export-orientation of local 
business and which facilitate commu-
nications with mainland Russia, as 
well as with the neighbouring coun-
tries, should be given first priority. 
With regard to cross-border transport 
infrastructure the focus should be on 
establishing a home-based inter-
national passenger air service, 
improving the transit railway line to 
mainland Russia for allowing higher 
speed, and reconstructing the Elblag–
Kaliningrad stretch of the former 
Berlin–Königsberg highway (opening 
of a respective border crossing in-
cluded). 
KO internal infrastructure projects 
should focus on bringing the tele-
communications systems to inter-
national standards and establishing a 
customised industrial estate for 
Russian and foreign investors, pref-
erably close to Kaliningrad inter-
national airport. As a stimulant for 
increasing local food production and 
reducing dependence on imports a 
wholesale food market should be 
established in Kaliningrad. 
Improving the infrastructure, reforming 
the system of economic governance and 
providing incentives for industrial re-
structuring, not to mention investment 
needed in social infrastructure and eco-
logical clean-up, will cost considerable 
funds.  
However, even at present a high 
amount of money is constantly trans-
ferred from the federal budget to Kalinin-
grad, but it is spent inefficiently. Never-
theless, additional funds from private 
investors and non-Russian donors have to 
be mobilized. Without a funding some-
how comparable in scale to what is avail-
able to the neighbouring states, Kalinin-
grad is condemned to fall further and 
further behind. 
It is proposed to establish a Kalinin-
grad Development Fund, in the first 
instance by the Northern Dimension 
group of states. Over a period of five 
to six years some 40 million Euro 
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annually should be mobilized, mainly 
for financing improvement of infra-
structure and measures enabling new 
business development opportunities to 
materialize. 
Civil Society Development and 
Trans-frontier Co-operation 
Participation of the Kaliningrad popula-
tion in a focused discourse on the future 
of the oblast is essential, because agree-
ments on Kaliningrad matters may fail to 
realise their problem-solving potential if 
they encounter strong feelings of resent-
ment in Kaliningrad. A population that 
feels frustrated and believes that its inter-
ests are not adequately taken into 
account, can easily be mobilized to per-
ceive its "last chance" in upheaval and 
trouble making. Kaliningraders might 
also be unready to believe in the idea of 
shared responsibility as they are used to 
being experimented upon.  
Those who want to advance the con-
cept of a pilot-region must consider the 
actual needs and interests of the oblast's 
inhabitants and provide them with the 
information on the concept they need to 
make up their minds. The Kaliningraders 
have to develop a stronger insight into the 
process and the concept; however, the 
possibility for that also depends on the 
input to the discourse made by people 
from mainland Russia and by non-
Russian actors.  
» 
» 
» 
» 
The contribution of Kaliningrad's 
population to the discourse on the fu-
ture of the oblast should increase as 
well as gain in substance. This con-
cerns likewise the elected representa-
tives, the media, the intelligentsia, all 
types of civil society groups and the 
institutions of higher education. Inten-
sifying an exchange of views within 
Kaliningrad and with mainland Russia 
and the wider Europe would demand 
NGOs and the media to be encouraged 
and enabled to play a stronger role. 
Further, foreign language training 
(with English as first priority) should 
be intensified and made available to 
anybody who wishes. 
Incorporating civil society 
development in the pilot-region 
concept 
A sound and sustainable development of 
the Kaliningrad region is hard to envisage 
without the emergence of a functioning 
civil society. This is especially true if 
such an ambitious and complex project as 
the pilot-region is pursued. 
However, developing civil society in 
Kaliningrad is more difficult to achieve 
than in Moscow or St Petersburg. This 
results primarily from the provincial 
character of the oblast and its isolated 
existence in the periphery of both Russia 
and the Europe of the EU. Furthermore, 
on the Russian side one should note the 
general hesitations as concerns the con-
cept, while on the part of the EU there is 
a poorly developed understanding of how 
to apply the concept to conditions such as 
prevail in Kaliningrad. 
A campaign, stimulating civic initia-
tive and also extending to the rural 
areas, should be launched. It should 
include encouragement to existing 
NGOs to co-operate more closely and 
to share with each other their experi-
ence, achievements and future plans. 
A "citizen prize" for best practice may 
help to raise awareness of issues rele-
vant to NGO activities. 
Support for civil society development 
in KO should not only aim at NGOs 
but also at the media, trade unions, 
institutions of higher education and 
local self-government bodies. 
Foreign organizations should offer 
assistance (including training) to 
NGOs in KO. However, a Code of 
Conduct for such support activities 
should be drafted by the Baltic Sea 
NGO Forum. A Donors' Forum should 
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be organized that identifies schemes 
supporting tri-angular co-operation of 
Kaliningrad based NGOs with respec-
tive organisations in mainland Russia 
and in neighbouring countries.  
The population of KO is significantly 
exposed to non-Russian cultural and 
intellectual influences, which have to be 
successfully integrated within the 
Russian heritage and identity. Kalinin-
grad's intellectual elite (scientists, artists, 
novelists, journalists etc.) and the forums 
at its disposal (not least the university) 
are faced by the demanding task of initi-
ating a high quality public discourse. 
How to prepare Kaliningrad intellectually 
for taking on the role of a pilot-region for 
Russia-EU relations?  
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Kaliningrad State University and 
other institutions of higher education 
should receive targeted support for 
meeting the needs of an intensified 
discourse on the future of KO and to 
provide the necessary intellectual in-
put.  
KO's unique location should be taken 
advantage of by extending the 
Kaliningrad EuroFaculty to further 
subjects, aiming at developing 
Kaliningrad State University as a 
centre of excellence for Russian-Euro-
pean Studies. The KSU should become 
attractive for Russians who want to 
enrol in European and in Baltic Sea 
Area Studies, as well as for students 
from abroad graduating in Russian 
Studies. The EU should get involved 
financially, providing long-term com-
mitment. 
Linked to an extended EuroFaculty, a 
think-tank should be established at the 
KSU which addresses the questions of 
relations between an enlarged EU and 
the Russian regions bordering it (like 
the EU-Russia Energy Technology 
Centre). 
Russian language studies for non-
Russians should be intensified and 
made more attractive. More courses of 
various subjects should be taught in 
English. Incentives should be given to 
motivate more Kaliningrad students to 
participate in the Tempus higher 
learning programme. 
Encouraging multiple identities 
Explaining identity-building and doing 
research into the issue is a task of imme-
diate political relevance, as identity is 
also about motivation of people to 
develop a sense of "belonging to" the 
region, and to feel responsible for the 
societal development, to communicate 
with their neighbours, and – especially in 
the Kaliningrad case – to help to pursue a 
goal which is of great significance for 
Russian policy: Russian participation in 
European integration. A conscious iden-
tity-building would demonstrate that it is 
possible to be a Kaliningrader, a Russian 
and a European at the same time.  
Co-operating across state borders, 
researchers from a variety of disci-
plines should give serious thought to 
identity-building in KO, its roots and 
perspectives, and its significance and 
consequences in society. 
The regional authorities and institu-
tions should continue to support 
research and teaching on the German 
past of the region and on all aspects of 
the post World War II events (for 
instance in the framework of the 
Mutual Commission for the Study of 
the Recent History of German-Russian 
Relations). 
In order to promote identity building, 
such history-writing could be under-
pinned by official acts of commemora-
tion and reconciliation, such as cele-
brating the 750th anniversary of 
Königsberg/Kaliningrad, setting up 
monuments to the victims of war and 
expulsion, where appropriate together 
with institutions in Germany. 
In order to improve the image of 
Kaliningrad, regional authorities and 
private investors are recommended 
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finally to decide what to do with the 
decaying Dom Sovetov in the city 
centre. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
Westerners must understand and posi-
tively recognise that the Kalinin-
graders are Russian by citizenship and 
language and predominantly as well 
by culture and religion. Thus, they 
should acknowledge appropriate 
measures taken by Russia to promote 
such belongingness. 
Evaluating the concept of 
Euroregions 
Trans-frontier co-operation is an impor-
tant means for complementing top level 
co-operation and integration from the 
grass-roots level. Thus, it is appreciated 
that Kaliningrad local entities participate 
in Euroregion schemes.  
The idea of creating such regions, as a 
means to further cross-border co-opera-
tion, is broadly accepted and not subject 
to political or emotional excitement. 
However, a realistic assessment of the 
actual practice regarding Euroregions at 
the eastern rim of the Baltic Sea region 
does not provide a basis for optimism. 
Rather, experience to date indicates that 
the concept has not met the expectations 
that it would function as a learning envi-
ronment for international co-operation 
among the sub-regions and municipalities 
- by setting priorities for development, 
promoting common projects and prepar-
ing for participation in the forthcoming 
structural funds' programmes.  
As Euroregions so far clearly do not 
guarantee the establishment of new 
public and private sector alliances 
addressing regional and local develop-
ment issues, two alternatives exist: to 
dismiss the concept as being idealistic 
rhetoric and to forget about it, or to radi-
cally improve it in order to make the idea 
work. Obviously citizens and the public 
sector lack any encouragement to get 
engaged when border region policies 
remain top-down and bureaucratic in 
character and socio-economic asymme-
tries exist among the partners from dif-
ferent sides of the border. 
The municipalities in KO should 
engage in Euroregions. For that 
purpose respective targeted amend-
ments in inter-budgetary relations are 
needed. Further, local officials have to 
be trained in the requirements of 
trans-frontier co-operation. Require-
ments for travel across borders have 
to be shaped in a manner not hinder-
ing trans-frontier co-operation. 
The concept of Euroregions needs to 
be reconsidered and improved when 
applied to Kaliningrad. Pragmatic 
steps should follow the recommenda-
tions given by the CBSS: 
- create a Baltic Euroregions net-
work in order to facilitate the 
exchange of views and experiences; 
- harmonise the EU's procedures 
and rules for receiving grants from 
the various instruments available 
for Euroregions (Phare, Interreg, 
Tacis); 
- request the Nordic Council of 
Ministers to provide counselling to 
Euroregions on legal matters. 
On a more fundamental level the 
Council of Europe and its Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities, to-
gether with the EU Committee of Re-
gions, should address the question of 
what type of border region policy is 
needed for successful Euroregion 
activities under the conditions of 
socio-economic and legal asymmetry. 
Appropriate expert opinions regarding 
those Euroregions that Kaliningrad 
local entities are involved in might be 
commissioned by the Council of 
Europe. 
Hard Security 
The issue of NATO enlargement and, 
therefore, regional hard security appears 
at present to be settled at the top-level of 
governments. Nevertheless it is a matter 
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of fact that relevant military capacities 
continue to exist – just as threat percep-
tions and mutual negative images of the 
other do – among the political elite and 
military leadership, as well as among the 
public, within Russia as regards NATO 
and in the NATO countries and aspirants 
as regards Russia. Matters may worsen 
again.  
Thus, as concerns the present situation 
there is no reason for feeling threatened, 
but neither is it wise to simply rely on the 
present state of affairs and to abstain 
from further measures of confidence-
building, arms control, disarmament and, 
in general, from problem-solving as 
regards hard security. 
All states in the Baltic Sea region 
maintain military forces as they regard 
the military as one instrument among 
others for achieving security and for 
demonstrating internally, as well as with 
regard to other states, their power and 
sovereignty. The strategic significance of 
the KO remains disputed within Russia as 
well as among the neighbours. 
The asymmetries built in to KO's ex-
istence as an exclave permit very differ-
ent perceptions among all states in the 
region of what is sufficient for defence 
and what goes beyond, or falls short; 
historically based sensitivities add to how 
military measures in the region are per-
ceived by other statist actors. Military 
measures in the KO or its vicinity can be 
well instrumentalized for political pur-
poses. At the same time, considerable 
segments of military deployments in the 
Baltic region are only partially subject to 
arms control regimes: maritime forces 
(with respect to which KO is central to 
the Russian military presence in the 
Baltic Sea) are completely unrestricted, 
whilst the Treaty on Conventional Forces 
in Europe has a loop-hole with respect to 
the Baltic States as well as Finland and 
Sweden. 
Russia should initiate a national dis-
cussion (including invited foreign 
experts) on force level and structure 
optimisation in the KO. It should 
further adopt a federal programme on 
the conversion of the Kaliningrad 
defence industry and of the former 
military personnel and infrastructure.  
» 
» 
» 
» 
Russia and Lithuania should conclude 
a new agreement on military transit 
(in consultations with the EU and 
NATO). 
NATO and Russia should agree on a 
co-operative agenda on the Baltics. 
Measures such as establishing a joint 
Russia-NATO Search and Rescue 
Centre in Kaliningrad, creating a joint 
centre for prevention of dangerous 
activities in the Baltic Sea area, and 
assistance in developing rehabilitation 
and re-training schemes for retired 
officers and housing programmes in 
KO should be considered. 
The OSCE should foster negotiations 
on a revision to the CFE-Treaty that 
would include the Baltic States as well 
as Sweden and Finland, and on an 
extension of the Confidence and Secu-
rity Building Measures (CSBM) to the 
sea. Further, it is recommended to 
start a dialogue on possibilities for 
limiting military activities and for 
naval arms control in the Baltic Sea. 
Military-to-military contacts, joint 
exercises, and exchange of informa-
tion on military doctrines etc. should 
be encouraged. 
Recognition of Rule and Borders 
Russian authorities continue to be wor-
ried about the possibility that the sover-
eignty of the Russian Federation over the 
exclave comes under strain, due to push 
and pull factors from the inside as well as 
from the outside. Any uncertainties and 
ambiguities as concerns the acceptance of 
Russian rule over Kaliningrad may 
negatively affect Russian readiness to 
enter into a frank international co-
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operation on Kaliningrad, such as the 
pilot-region.  
Experts differ in their assessment of 
the intensity to which Russian rule over 
Kaliningrad can become actually chal-
lenged, but agree that it is mainly a 
Russian responsibility to deal with sepa-
ratist tendencies, in case they exist in 
Kaliningrad due to its structural condi-
tions. They further agree that foreign 
actors should make sure that Russian 
worries find a constructive response and 
that fuelling them should be prevented, 
even if those who voice secessionist or 
revisionist views represent only minority 
factions in society and even less so, if at 
all, in politics. The same holds for the 
mirror image situation of ambiguities on 
the Russian side as concerns the belong-
ing of the Klaipeda Region to Lithuania. 
The challenge to be tackled is the fact 
that - for reasons rooted in history – the 
existing borders are still not fully and un-
ambiguously recognized by some 
segments of public consciousness and 
that this remnant of history can be 
instrumentalized for present day political 
aims. Risks can be diminished by actions 
that establish Kaliningrad in the minds of 
the people, as well as in politics, more 
self-evidently and less ambiguously as 
being Russian, and to reassure Russian 
politics and society that this is accepted 
by the outside world. Again, the same 
holds for the Klaipeda case. 
As a general baseline it is recom-
mended neither to downplay nor to 
dramatize the fact that the KO as well 
as the Klaipeda Region has been his-
torically contested territory and that 
this causes worries on the Russian 
and, respectively, the Lithuanian side. 
Instead, the issue should be treated as 
a self-evident part of the overall 
Kaliningrad discourse among states as 
well as among non-state actors and 
the intellectual community. 
» 
» 
» 
» 
The EU and its member states should 
give official confirmation to Russia, 
without reservations and in a legally 
binding format, that they recognize the 
KO as being de jure a part of the 
Russian Federation. Such a declara-
tion should also be signed by the can-
didate states. 
The Russian State Duma should 
speedily bring to a positive end the 
outstanding ratification of the Rus-
sian-Lithuanian Border Treaty. 
All Baltic Sea countries and societal 
actors, as well as international or-
ganisations, are recommended to 
foster the process of reconciliation. 
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recognised as one of the architects of peace and stability in the Baltic region. However, 
his involvement into the interethnic reconciliation in Estonia and Latvia was formally 
limited to the recommendations made to the respective governments. 
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